Introduction
The ENP (European Neighborhood Policy) is an experiment in stabilizing the European Union's eastern and southern perimeter. Its aim is to institutionalize economic, political and social relations between the EU countries and their neighbors in the areas of trade, investment, immigration, and political and legislative co-operation. EU 'neighbors' can be divided into countries with accession agreements still to be implemented, countries anticipating accession, and countries without any prospects of EU membership. The ENP is directed at the latter group. It signals the maximum level of integration to which they can aspire on the one hand and a slew of benefits (such as removal of trade barriers, political co-operation, participation in EU programs, cultural, scientific and environmental agreements, legislative harmonization) on the other.
Migration is an issue high on the ENP agenda and has been has been articulated in various agreements such as the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere, Hague and Stockholm Programs. While the last EU enlargement saw the EU population grow larger and younger, the EU27 is still characterized by an ageing demographic structure, decreasing fertility rates and increasing life expectancy. In contrast, the demographics of the EN countries point to a much younger age structure and a short term labor force growth rate of 3-5 percent per year (Martin 2009 ). Due to demographic pressures in the EN countries and ageing in the EU, international migration is the main source of population growth in Europe. The new member states are an obvious source of this growth, and the EN is an increasingly important force. The EU is the destination choice of 78 percent of East Europeans, 79 percent of Middle East migrants and 93 percent of North Africans. Of the estimated 23 million non-EU migrants within the EU, some 9.3m (40 percent) are from the EN. Of these, over 70 percent originate from the southern EN countries (including Turkey) and 29 percent come from the eastern EN states (including Russia) (Fargues 2013) .
EN immigration policy is part of an EU attempt to regulate border security in three areas: illegal (or irregular) immigration, combating trafficking and smuggling of human beings, and cross-border management practice. Ostensibly, regulated migration policy is perceived as benefiting both EN and EU countries over the short term. For the former, migration is a 'safety valve' solution for the lack of local employment opportunities. Labor migration can reduce domestic unemployment pressures, upgrade the human capital base of return migrants and secure remittances in order to finance development at home. For the EU countries, it provides a short run solution to its demographic imbalance and ageing population, reducing inflationary wage pressure, increasing labor market mobility and boosting growth. Thus potentially, migration policy can be conceived as diverting human hardship in the EN and promoting growth and prosperity in the EU. Over the longer term, things are less clear cut. For the EU countries, using EN migration to match the demand-supply shortfall is only feasible in the context of sustained economic growth. Given the recessionary environment in the EU since 2008-9 this is currently unrealistic. For the EN unregulated migration can simply exacerbate the north-south divide in Europe hindering the chances of domestic structural economic and labor market reform.
In this paper we focus on the determinants of immigration from EN countries to the EU over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . The EU is also a popular migration destination for other (non EN) countries of origins such as the new EU member states (Romania, Bulgaria) and the EU accession candidates (Iceland, Serbia, Turkey) . However for these countries, some of the issues of welfare-chasing and enforcement that are highly pertinent for EN countries are less so for their new member competitors for whom freedom of movement comes with EU membership. The economic crisis of the last few years however, has served to qualify this situation and following EU enlargement, restrictions on labor movement have been intermittently introduced by many of the EU15 core states with respect to new members.
Our particular concern with EN countries limits the scope of our study to crosssection data for 2000 -2010 during which annual panel data are not available. De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) and have used annual panel data to study international migration which enables the identification of time invariant determinants of migration by fixed effects. Since the data we use are decadal from the 1960s it was in principle possible to use panel data econometrics in which the units of time are decades rather than years. Since it was only possible to obtain reliable data on key covariates for 2000 -2010, the study uses cross-section data. broke new ground by allowing for cross-section dependence between the panel units. Following Pesaran (2006) they specify a common factor model that relates pairwise migrations from origins to destinations.
Specifically, pair-wise migration depends on total migration during period t from all origins, and the average cross-section values during period t of the covariates in the migration model. The sensitivity or factor loadings with respect to these time-series factors are assumed to vary by origin and destinations. In this way pairwise migrations depend on third country effects. Third country effects are a major focus in the present study. Pesaran's estimator is only feasible in panel data, and in any case circumscribes cross-section dependence to a common factor structure. We suggest that third country effects can be specified in cross-section data by using spatial econometric concepts. This approach serves as a methodological alternative to Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2012) who specify multilateral resistance through origin-nest dummies chosen to eliminate spatial autocorrelation. Indeed, apart from the focus on emigration from EN countries to EU countries, a methodological contribution involves the identification of spatial dynamics in origins and destinations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature relating to the determinants of migration to the EU with special reference to positive selection and welfare-chasing motives. The methodology used is described in section 3. This involves estimating gravity models for immigration from EN and other origins to EU14 1 destinations. The methodology is both multilateral and spatial. It is multilateral because we do not assume that immigration from the EN to EU14 is independent of immigration from other geopolitical blocs including the EU enlargement countries such as Poland, the EU accession countries such as Turkey, and the rest of the world. For example, immigrants from the rest of the world might crowd-out immigrants from the EN. It is spatial because immigration from origins to destinations might not be independent of what is happening in the vicinities of the origins and in the vicinities of the destinations.
In section 4 we describe the variables used and the limitations imposed by the available data. We focus particularly on statistical measures of generosity in the provision of social 1 EU14 relates to the core EU15 with the exception of Portugal. See Section 4.1 and note 4 for further details welfare that might induce welfare-motivated migration, and on measures of policy enforcement to deter irregular immigration. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and presents gravity models for immigration from EN and other origins into EU14 destinations using standard, non-spatial econometrics, as well as spatial econometrics for single and double spatial dynamics.
Determinants of Migration to the EU
The determinants of immigration can be broadly grouped into three classes (Hooghe, Trappers, Meuleman and Reeskens 2008) . Economic and labor based theories posit that income and employment differences between origin and destination are likely to motivate immigration. If immigrants are positively selected (Borjas 1987) they are likely to earn more where wage inequality is greater, in which case they will be attracted by countries in which there is more wage inequality. Cultural and linguistic explanations put weight on the ability of immigrants to acculturate (Chiswick and Miller 1992 , 2003 , Dustmann and van Soest 2002 . Finally, networks explanation attaches importance to the role of social ties, chain effects and familial linkages in promoting immigration (Munshi 2003 , Patel and Vella 2012 , Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith 2008 . Within these broad groupings the relative weights of pull factors at the destination and push factors at the origin is an empirical issue.
The focus on wage differentials in immigration dates back to Hicks (1932) and Sjaastad (1962) . However, the recent focus on welfare-chasing has a more historic pedigree. Following the Elizabethan Poor Laws (1601) levels of relief were set by the parishes. To prevent welfare-chasing from less generous parishes to more generous parishes the Law of Settlements required paupers to obtain relief in their own parish. In his Wealth of Nations Adam Smith (1776) observed with disapproval that the Law of Settlements generated artificial wage differentials between parishes because it inhibited labor mobility, and called for their repeal 2 . Contemporary empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis has been found for the EU (Péridy 2006 , De Giorgi and Pellizzari 2009 , Docquier and Marfouk 2006 and Razin et al 2011 .
2 "There is scarce a poor man in England of fourty years of age…who has not in some part of his life felt himself most cruelly oppressed by this ill-contrived law of settlements" (Smith 1776 , Vol 1 p.124).
The factors driving migration flows to the EU have been investigated extensively.
Much of the earlier literature is reviewed by Kahanec (2013) . With successive rounds of EU enlargement, recent studies have tended to focus on the role of immigration policies in shaping migration flows to the EU and whether any real EU immigration policy can be identified (Wesselink and Boschma 2011). Mayda (2010) and Ortega and Peri (2012) have looked at the elasticity of immigration with respect to income in destinations and the relationship between this and temporal differences in enforcement of immigration policy (periods of tightness and laxity in policy implementation).
Theory suggests that having born the significant costs of migrating, immigrants will tend to cluster in places offering the most attracting welfare benefits (Borjas 1999 ).
Higher skilled immigrants will tend shun these locations in order to avoid having to pay for this benevolence. wage and union bargaining agreements should affect labor markets with respect to both prices (wages) and quantities (employment) and change the relative costs and benefits of migration. They also test for complementarity / substitution between welfare motivated migration and immigration policy. They find that stricter migration policies are inversely related to immigration. GDP per capita has a large and direct effect for destinations but no significant effect for origins. In terms of welfare-chasing, they show that employment protection and minimum wages have positive effects on immigration while union power and unemployment benefits have less effect. In testing for interaction between immigration policy and welfare their findings show that the positive effect attributed to welfare inducements is higher in countries where immigration policy enforcement is lower. Comparing the EN countries with other origin countries, they find that the negative effect of GDP is stronger in the former than the latter. Dividing the EN countries into a North African group (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt) versus the rest (Eastern Europe and Middle East), they identify a strong negative effect of GDP in the origins for the rest of the EN, but no significant effects for North African EN countries.
In addition, the negative effect of immigration policies on immigration is shown to be stronger for EN immigrants from East Europe and the Middle East than for immigrants from North Africa. This could be related to skill levels; 33 percent of migrants from the former are skilled while for North Africa the share is only 25 percent. They interpret this as indicating that migrants from East Europe and the Middle East only decide to migrate when their prospects at home are meager. The propensity to migrate for North Africans at a commensurate skill level is much higher.
Methodology

Bilateral Gravity
We estimate the determinants of EN-EU migration using a spatial variant of the gravity To obtain these total effects equation (3) is vectorized: 
Spatial Gravity
From equation (6) the total effects of the push and pull variables in origins and destinations on emigration from origin o to destination d are: 
Levels and Differences of Push and Pull Variables
Let F od denote the foreign-born from origin o in destination d. Ignoring secondary emigration and mortality y od = F od . Sjaasted (1962) suggested that emigration is the outcome of a partial adjustment model in which the equilibrium number of foreign-born depends on the levels of pull factors in the destinations (Z d ) and the levels of push factors in the origins (Z o ). For example, the equilibrium number of foreign-born varies directly with income in destinations and inversely with income in origins. This means that in equilibrium income differentials between origins and destinations may persist. The equilibrium number of foreign-born is hypothesized to be:
The partial adjustment model is:
where positive fractions  and  are partial adjustment parameters. Substituting equation (8) into (9) gives:
According to equation ( If immigration is large relative to the destination and origin economies the concern with cross-section endogeneity is more important than if it is small. We show below that immigration during the study period was most probably too small to induce identification problems; the tail of immigration was too small to wag the dog. 
Exogeneity of Push and Pull Variables
Data
The Dependent Variable
We study emigration rates We restrict the EU destinations to the 14 core countries for two reasons. First, the This partly explains how immigration ( Some of these estimated rates of immigration are very large especially in destinations where there were few foreign-born in 2000. Table 3 reports the foreign-born in EU14 in levels and changes for the three main geopolitical groups. The lower part translates these numbers into emigration rates and rates of increase in foreign-born. The highest rates of emigration occurred in the accession countries and the lowest for the EN countries. On average, emigration rates were 0.64% during the decade and the foreign-born increased by almost a quarter.
Explanatory Variables
The variables, their data sources and definitions are provided in Appendix 1. As argued in section 3.3 we expect that immigration during period t to t+1 is affected by the initial levels as well as the changes in the push and pull factors in origins and destinations. For example, immigration is hypothesized to vary directly with welfare generosity in 2000, as well as changes in welfare generosity by 2010. The welfare-chasing hypothesis of immigration posits that given everything else, destinations offering more social benefits will be more attractive. Therefore, where the data are available, we test for both level effects as well as changes for all variables. Welfare benefits have not risen uniformly in all 14 destinations (Table 4) . Social expenditure has grown mainly in those countries that subsequently became the epicenter of the Eurozone crisis at the end of the decade, namely Greece, Ireland and Italy. Finally, although GMDB is available on a decennial basis since 1960, we focus our efforts on the last decade only (2000 -2010) . Had all the covariates, such as welfare generosity, inequality and enforcement been available for earlier decades, it would have been possible in principle to estimate equation (5) using panel data for 5 decades rather than cross-section data. However, we were unable to obtain the necessary data for the covariates dating back to the 1960s. In any case the estimation of dynamic panel data with spatial dependence constitutes uncharted econometric territory. Therefore, we concentrate our efforts on immigration during the last decade, which is most probably of greater interest to policy makers than immigration in the 1960s and 1970s.
Results
We begin by estimating equation (5) by OLS, which ignores spatial dependence within origins and destinations. The baseline specification, which appears in Table 7 , is obtained following a specification search in which levels (for 2000) and changes (between 2000 and 2010) of variables discussed in section 4, such as GDP per head in origins and destinations, are specified in an unrestricted model, which subsequently is nested-down using the general-to-particular methodology to the restricted model that features in Table   7 . The restricted baseline model is intentionally "lenient" in that it includes covariates with t-statistics below standard levels of statistical significance. These sub-marginal variables have been retained in face of the possibility that in spatial specifications their statistical significance might increase. Therefore, we err on the side of caution in the baseline specification. However, numerous variables such as GDP per head in EU destinations do not appear in the baseline model because they were clearly statistically insignificant.
Thereafter, we estimate equation (5) 
OLS: Standard Gravity Model
By using OLS as the baseline model we run the risk of inducing pre-test bias since had the baseline been spatial the restricted model might have contained different covariates to its OLS counterpart. This would imply that OLS and spatial specifications are not necessarily nested. We justify the use of OLS as the baseline for two reasons. First, we think that just as temporal dynamics are unlikely to influence the choice of covariates in time series data, so spatial dynamics should not influence the choice of covariates in spatial cross section data. Indeed, we find that the OLS covariates are spatially robust with respect to spatial misspecification. Second, it is technically easier to conduct specification searches using OLS than it is using SAR models, and especially double spatial lag models which are numerically challenging to estimate. .06) 0.0228 (2.70) The OLS model reported in Table 7 shows that immigrants are deterred by unemployment in EU destinations, and although emigration rates do not depend on income per head in EU14, immigrants are attracted by income inequality in EU14, suggesting that immigrants are positively selected. On the other hand, emigration rates vary inversely with income per head in origins. Immigration does not depend on the level of welfare generosity but it varies directly with changes in generosity. Therefore, cutting welfare generosity as measured by social spending per head reduces immigration, suggesting that some immigrants are also negatively selected. EU countries with ageing populations attract immigrants perhaps because of increased work opportunities for taking care of the elderly. Foreign-born from the rest of the world crowd-out immigrants from the origins, but immigration from the rest of the world crowds-in immigrants from the origins in the study. This suggests that incumbent immigrants from ROW are substitutes for new immigrants from EN and other countries, whereas new immigrants from ROW and EN and other immigrants in the study are complements. Emigration rates vary directly with the number of foreign-born in the destinations. However, this effect is small and is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Immigration policy, as measured by acceptance rates among asylum seekers, has a positive effect on emigration rates, however, it is not statistically significant. Experiments with other measures of immigration policy came up with "wrong" signs. For example, emigration rates vary directly with enforcement policy as measured by apprehension and removal rates of irregular immigrants, but these effects are not statistically significant.
We suspect reverse causality from immigration (enforcement of immigration policy may be more pro-active where immigration is greater) is likely to bias upwards this parameter concealing the true deterrent effect. Common languages encourage immigration but distance (not shown) does not matter. Immigration is higher from the accession countries, but a Chow test reveals (not shown) that the factors driving immigration from EN countries are the same as those affecting other immigrants, except EN immigrants are less sensitive to changes in welfare policy. Table 7 use the latter. We do not think that this raises methodological difficulties because intra-destination immigration and intra-origin immigration are unlikely to be related to immigration between origins and destinations. For example, emigration from France to Belgium is unlikely to be dependent on emigration from Morocco to France or Belgium. Although the signs and the significance levels of the SAR coefficient depend on the weighting criteria, the likelihoods of these spatial models are similar and exceed their OLS counterpart.
Spatial Gravity
On the whole the means and the variances of the OLS estimates turn out to be robust with respect to the specification of a single spatial lag. The same applies to the double spatial lag model in Table 7 (SAROD) where the means and variances of the parameter estimates are similar to their OLS counterparts. In the SAROD model  D is negative and statistically significant whereas  O is positive but not statistically significant. The former implies spatial substitution in emigration rather than spatial complementarity; e.g. if more immigrants emigrate to France fewer emigrate France's neighbors. suggesting that welfare generosity adversely affects migration to neighboring destinations. However, this effect was not statistically significant at conventional levels (t -statistic = -1.6).
In Table 7 Since the estimated likelihood 6 is largest when immigration is used for spatial weighting we have selected it for presentation in Table 7 .
Size Effects
The SAROD model in Table 7 is used to calculate the effects of the covariates on emigration rates. The direct effects are simply equal to  O and  D and are reported in Table 9 ignore spatial propagation. We use equations (7), which account for spatial propagation, to calculate the total effect of the covariates on emigration rates. For these purposes we calculate the effect of a 1 percent increase in social spending per head in individual destinations on emigration rates from all origins to all destinations. In the absence of spatial dynamics emigration rates would increase by 0.0172 percentage points from EN origins and by 0.0256 percentage points from other origins, while emigration rates to other destinations would not be affected. The mean across all origins is 0.0222 percentage points. Table 10 reports the effects of spatial propagation induced by an increase in social spending per head of one percent. The direct effect on emigration rates (0.022 percentage points) is the same for all countries The effect on destination refers to the change in emigration rates from all origins to the destination country that increased social spending per capita. The total effect refers to the effect on emigration rates to all destinations taking into account deflection of immigration from other EU destinations. For example, if France alone increases social spending per head the total effect increases emigration rates to France by 0.0229 percentage points, which slightly exceeds the direct effect of 0.022. This increase is induced by positive spatial propagation. However, part of this increase is due to deflection from other destinations. Allowing for deflection immigration to EU destinations as a whole increases by only 0.0116 percentage points, which is considerable less than the direct effect and the effect on France. Table 10 shows that these spatial effects vary by country. For example, if Germany raises social spending per head emigration rates increase to Germany by 0.0234 percentage points, which exceeds its French counterpart. However, this increase is almost entirely induced by deflection since emigration rates to the EU as a whole (Germany included) increase by only 0.005 percentage points. By contrast, if Austria raises social spending per head the total effect is 0.0214 percentage points, which is almost as large as the direct effect. This happens because Austria is less spatially connected than Germany, which is highly spatially connected. If all EU destinations raise social spending per head at the same time the average effect on EU destinations as a whole is 0.0168, which is less than the direct effect due to negative spatial substitution. The whole is less than the sum of its parts. For some destinations such as Italy the increase will be less than 0.0168, while for others such as Luxembourg it will be more.
Conclusion
We have used cross-section data during 2000 -2010 However, for immigrants from the European Neighborhood these increases are 1.95 percent and 0.5 percent.
A methodological conclusion is that OLS gravity models over-estimate size effects by ignoring spatial substitution. For example, the OLS estimate of the size effect of 2.6 percent mentioned in the previous paragraph and estimated using spatial gravity, is 4 percent. In the present study OLS size effects are biased upwards because they ignore "multilateral resistance" induced by the fact that EU destinations are rivals.
The fact that changes in welfare benevolence matter rather than levels suggests that in 2000 numbers of foreign-born (immigrant stock) were already in equilibrium, and that immigration during 2000 to 2010 was induced by changes in these equilibria. Also, EU membership greatly expanded during this decade underscoring this disturbance.
Another robust result is that immigrants are attracted by economic inequality as measured by the by the Gini coefficient. However, in this case it is the level that matters rather than its change. Moreover, levels and changes of income per capita did not have any significant effect on immigration to the EU14 during 2000 to 2010. These results support the selection model of immigration according to which immigrants are positively selected and seek countries which will provide them with greater compensation for their skills. This is more likely to occur where income dispersion is greater.
We do not find evidence that the threat of apprehension deters migrants from the EN and other countries. We think that this is largely for technical reasons. The 'stick' of enforcement measures wielded over the last decade has apparently not been able to counteract the 'carrot' embodied in European living standards. Had we been more able to control for the latter, we might have been successful in identifying the deterrence. Also, if countries with more exposure to immigration wield bigger "sticks", their deterrent effect will be concealed through reverse causality.
Finally, the increase in unemployment in EU since 2008 should have had a major effect in reducing immigration from EN and other origins because immigration is very sensitive to the rate of unemployment. Indeed, we expect that emigration rates fell by more than a half because of the European recession. 
Welfare Generosity Variables
Growth in social spending/head: destination is the natural log of the lagged decade average public social expenditure in the destination country. The data source is OECDStat that presents expenditure on social programs by countries. We used public expenditure on social issues per head (in constant 2000 PPP USD) and averaged these across the decade. 
